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COMPETING FOR LOYALTY: THE
DYNAMICS OF RALLYING SUPPORT
MATIAS IARYCZOWER AND SANTIAGO OLIVEROS
Abstract. We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a
single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group.
We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their
support to principals sequentially. A danger for the agents in this context is that a prin-
cipal may be able to succeed by exploiting competition among members of the group.
Would agents benefit from introducing competition between opposing principals? We
show that when principals’ policies provide value to the agents, competition actually
reduces agents’ welfare. JEL codes: D70, D72, C78.
keywords: contracting externalities, political economy, corporate takeovers, vote buying.
1. Introduction
Collective action problems can make groups weak and ineffective. This is particularly
problematic when an external principal can exploit the incentives of individual mem-
bers to free ride on each other, leading the group to devastating outcomes with little
compensation to only some of its members. The free-riding problem appears in central
applications throughout economics, from corporate governance (corporate takeovers) to
public economics (public good provision), political economy (vote buying), and industrial
organization (exclusive deals).
Consider for example exclusive deals. In the classical version of this problem, an incum-
bent firm attempts to exclude rivals by signing exclusive contracts with buyers. While
preventing entry hurts buyers, an incumbent using discriminatory offers can induce indi-
vidual buyers to sign these contracts without being fully compensated, by turning buyers
against one another (Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley Jr (1991), Segal and Whinston
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(2000)). But the incumbent can also achieve a similar result even without using complex
contracts if it can contract with buyers sequentially. The key point of the previous papers,
in fact, is that sequential contracting strengthens the incumbent’s ability to exclude by
exacerbating the free-rider problem among buyers.
A similar logic applies to vote buying. Dal Bo (2007) shows that a single principal can
lead a group to her preferred decision at a negligible cost by using “pivotal” contracts,
which allow the principal to commit to bribes that are conditional on the entire vote
profile. But Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) and Genicot and Ray (2006) show that the
principal can also exploit the group without using complex contracts if she can approach
voters sequentially.
A common feature of the situations in which sequential contracting is pervasive is the irre-
versibility of agents’ actions. In the exclusive deals setup, for instance, the irreversibility
comes from the fact that buyers sign a contract with the incumbent. To varying degrees,
this feature is at the core of a number of key problems in politics and economics. A party
notable who publicly supports a presidential candidate cannot switch his support to the
other candidate without facing a reputational loss. A firm that chooses between two alter-
native technologies (Blu-ray or HD-DVD, Boeing or Airbus) can only switch technologies
at a substantial adjustment cost. A shareholder that sells its shares to a raider attempting
a takeover simply cannot undo this action.
The reason why sequential contracting can be problematic for members of the group is
that it can allow principals to create and exploit an intertemporal competition among
members of the group: “take this now, otherwise I’ll find others to support me and you’ll
get nothing”. Suppose for example that a principal is trying to induce members of a
legislature to vote for an unpopular fiscal austerity measure. A legislator might want
to support the legislation even in exchange of a small benefit when the alternative is
to get the outcome without receiving any compensation. The key point here is that a
legislator’s outside option declines in the number of individuals who have effectively been
bribed (Genicot and Ray (2006)).
But what if two incumbent firms were to compete for exclusive contracts, or two lobbies
were to compete for committee members’ votes, or if the incumbent management were
to fight a raider’s attempt to take over the firm? Would agents benefit from competition
between opposing principals in these contexts?
On the face of it, the answer to this question seems straightforward: since a single principal
can exploit agents by picking the group apart – the logic goes – introducing competition
must naturally increase agents’ welfare. We show, however, that this intuition can be
misleading. As it turns out, a key consideration is whether the principal’s policy provides
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value to the agents or not relative to the status quo. In a public good environment, agents
prefer the principal’s policy to the status quo. This is the case of a presidential candidate
with high changes of winning the general election, a party line favored by backbenchers, or
a value-creating raider attempting a corporate takeover. In a costly actions environment,
instead, the success of the principal leads to a loss for the agents. This can be the case
with coalitions for war, exclusive deals, or unpopular legislative policies.
Our main result is that competition between principals generally improves agents’ welfare
with costly actions, but reduces agents’ welfare with public goods. In fact, when two
leaders stand behind equally good alternatives, agents are always better off when facing a
single alternative than two alternatives. In general, with public goods, agents are always
better off facing the best alternative by itself than two alternatives, even if the difference in
the value of the two alternatives is arbitrarily small. Moreover, when the number of agents
is sufficiently large, agents can be better off with a monopoly of the worst alternative than
when this alternative competes with an arbitrarily better alternative. With costly actions,
instead, the results reverse, and competition is indeed beneficial.
The superiority of monopoly to competition depends crucially on the nature of the free-
riding effect. In a public good setting – as it is the case with an efficient raid – agents
would benefit from not trading with the principal. In this context free-riding oppor-
tunities give agents bargaining power against the principal. We show that competition
between principals reduces the value of free-riding in expectation, and thus diminishes
the bargaining power of agents vis a vis the monopolistic setting.1
Consider the problem of the pivotal follower in each case. In the single alternative case,
if the pivotal follower refuses an offer by the leader, there is a relatively high chance
that some other uncommitted follower will come to the negotiating table tomorrow and
the game will end. This relatively high free-riding ability gives the pivotal follower a
considerable bargaining power against the leader and protects him from getting fully
expropriated. Now consider the problem of a pivotal follower under competition. The
number of uncommitted followers with competing principals is at most as large as in the
single alternative case – if one principal was completely shut out – and is generally lower.
In fact, if the battle between the leaders is very close, a follower could be pivotal when
both leaders need only one additional commitment to win. But in this case there are
no free riding possibilities, and as a result, the pivotal follower has no bargaining power.
The example is extreme, but the logic is similar in all other cases in which a leader is
1With negative externalities (costly actions in our setup) competition is indeed beneficial to followers.
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not shut out; competition between the leaders gives the pivotal follower fewer free-riding
possibilities, and results in a lower equilibrium payoff for the followers.2
A concern in this context is the possible multiplicity of equilibria. We show that this is
not an issue in our case, as our results holds for all Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE).
In fact, we establish our main result using an induction argument that exploits general
equilibrium properties.
In the main part of the paper we present a stripped down model that isolates the key
aspects of the problem. In this benchmark model, followers’ payoffs in terminal nodes
are unaffected by whether they supported the eventual winner, the eventual loser, or
remained uncommitted. An indirect consequence of this simplifying assumption is that
transfers from principals to agents are positive in the costly actions model, but negative
with public goods, a feature that can be unappealing in some applications. We show,
however, that in an expanded version of the model where we allow payoffs to depend
on whether each follower backed a winning or losing candidate, the direction of the cash
transfer is unrelated to whether the decision involves a public good or a costly action,
and, concomitantly, on whether competition is hurtful or beneficial for followers. In fact,
under reasonable assumptions on parameters, most relevant applications involve positive
transfers. We illustrate this with a modified version of the celebrated paper on corporate
takeovers by Grossman and Hart (1980).
The reversal of the direction of the transfers does not alter the main free-riding logic at
the core of our results. When the terminal payoff of an uncommitted follower is positive
(public goods) meeting the leader is bad news for followers, and followers have an incentive
to free ride. In the benchmark model this is just because of the cash transfer. In the
expanded model this happens because of the change in total compensation, even when
cash transfers go in the opposite direction. The key point that holds in all versions of the
model is that competition hurts followers because it reduces free riding opportunities.
2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. One is the literature on contracting
with externalities, developed largely within industrial organization. These papers explore
problems in which a single principal contracts with a group of agents in the presence of
2The intuition for the reversal of the result with costly actions is the mirror image of the public good
case. Since in this case followers receive positive transfers from the principal/s in equilibrium, by refusing
an offer followers risk not receiving an offer at all (not being compensated for a change that will happen
anyways). Because this outside option determines their bargaining power vis a vis the principal, followers
are better off when the chances of this happening are smaller (i.e., under competition).
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externalities among agents (e.g., corporate takeovers, exclusive contracts). The second is
the literature on vote buying and interest group influence developed in political economy.
In these papers, two lobbyists compete offering transfers to members of a committee to
obtain their support in favor or against a bill. The paper is also more loosely connected
to the literature on innovation races.
The seminal paper in the literature on contracting with externalities is Grossman and
Hart (1980), on corporate takeovers. The main point of the paper is that externalities
across shareholders can prevent takeovers that add value to the company. The idea is
that since shareholders that do not sell can capture the increase in value brought by the
raider, no shareholder will tender his shares at a price that would allow the raider to profit
from the takeover. Free-riding is also at the heart of the papers by Rasmusen, Ramseyer,
and Wiley Jr (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000), which study a problem in which
an incumbent firm may be able to exclude rivals by signing exclusive deals with buyers.
This hurts the buyers, but the incumbent is able to pull this off when it can turn buyers
against one another exploiting the externalities that exist among them. These papers
show that the incumbent’s ability to deal with buyers sequentially strengthens its ability
to exclude, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem among buyers.
A fundamental reason why the principal can exploit the agents in the Rasmusen et al and
Segal papers – as opposed to say in efficient takeovers – is that by signing an exclusive
contract a buyer imposes a negative externality on other buyers.3 This assumption is
maintained in Genicot and Ray (2006), who study optimal sequencing of offers for a
single principal interacting with a group of agents who impose negative externalities on
each other by contracting with the principal. As in Segal and Whinston (2000), here
too a subset of the agents are exploited by the principal, accepting low offers because
they anticipate that if they were to reject this offer, “other agents must succumb to the
sequential onslaught” (Genicot and Ray (2006)).4
The literature on contracting with externalities is closely related to our monopolistic model
(Section 4.1), where the externality is due to the fact that agents make a collective decision.
The key innovation of our paper is to extend the model of sequential contracting with
3The distinction between positive and negative externalities, as well as increasing or decreasing external-
ities among agents in contracting models was first introduced in a static setting by Segal (1999), which
offers a model of contracting with externalities that unifies various applications. The focus of this paper is
on how the type of externalities among agents affect efficiency. Segal (2003) examines “robust” bilateral
contracting with externalities (in the sense of implementation assuming the worst equilibrium for the
principal) under various assumptions about the bargaining technology.
4This is also the case in the single-principal vote buying model by Dal Bo (2007), which also imposes
negative externalities among agents. In this context, the principal can exploit agents even in a static
setting, by using pivotal contracts. Relatedly, Segal (2003) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that
the principal can exploit agents in a static setting if she can make discriminatory offers.
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externalities to a competitive setup and compare the welfare of agents under monopoly
and competition.5 In fact, the result that monopoly is preferred to competition depends
crucially on the nature of the free-riding effect introduced by Grossman and Hart. In
a public good setting – as it is the case with an efficient raid – agents would benefit
from not trading with the principal. In this context free-riding opportunities give agents
bargaining power against the principal. Our main result establishes that competition
between principals reduces the value of free-riding in expectation, and thus diminishes
the bargaining power of agents vis a vis the monopolistic setting.6
Our model of competition between principals is related to the literature on vote buying,
where two lobbyists make offers to agents to win their support (Myerson (1993), Grose-
close and Snyder (1996), Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008, 2009), Morgan and Va´rdy
(2011)). Relative to this literature, the fundamental innovation is to introduce sequential
“vote buying” with irreversible actions by followers. The closest to this are the Dekel,
Jackson and Wolinsky papers, which also have an infinite horizon, two parties competing
for votes, and – in some versions of the model – partial irreversibility. However, here
(as in all the previous vote buying literature) agents are not considered strategic actors,
and are assumed to vote sincerely at each point in time for the alternative giving them a
higher payoff. In our model, instead, agents are fully strategic and forward looking, as in
the sequential bargaining setup of Gul (1989) and Iaryczower and Oliveros (2013).
Because of the dynamic nature of our game, the competition between principals resembles
the models of innovation races pioneered by Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987). In contrast
with this literature, in our model steps forward for the principals require interactions with
agents that are forward-looking and strategic.
3. The Basic Model
Two leaders, A and B, compete to gather the support of a majority of members (followers)
in a group of size n. The first leader to obtain the commitment of q ≡ (n+ 1)/2 members
wins, and implements her preferred alternative. There is an infinite number of periods,
t = 1, 2, . . .. In each period t before a leader won, any one of the k(t) uncommitted
followers at time t meets leader ` = A,B with probability pi`/k(t). Say that at the time of
5The literature on non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games with externalities considers general bar-
gaining problems with multiple agents (Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999), Ray and Vohra (2001),
Gomes (2005), Gomes and Jehiel (2005)). These papers aim to establish efficiency, existence and unique-
ness properties in this class of games, and are for the most part unrelated to the industrial organization
literature on contracting with externalities.
6Our results also show that with negative externalities (costly actions in our setup) competition is indeed
beneficial to followers.
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the meeting, ` needs m` additional followers to win. In the meeting with an uncommitted
follower i, leader ` offers i an amount p`(m`,m−`) to secure i’s support (possibly −∞).
Follower i can accept or reject `’s offer. If he accepts, he commits his support for ` and
receives p`(m`,m−`). If he rejects the offer, i remains uncommitted.
Leader ` gets a payoff of v` > 0 if and when she wins, and v` if and when her opponent
j 6= ` wins, v` > v`. In any period before a leader wins, leaders get a payoff of zero (a
normalization). In the basic model, we assume that leaders provide value to the agents;
i.e., followers get a payoff of w` > 0 if and when alternative ` wins.
7 As with leaders, we
normalize followers’ payoffs in any period before an alternative wins to zero. Leaders and
followers have discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The solution concept is Markov Perfect equilib-
rium (MPE). We let W (~m) denote the continuation value of an uncommitted follower in
state ~m ≡ (mA,mB), Wout(~m) denote the continuation value of a committed follower in
state ~m, and V`(~m) denote the continuation value of leader ` in state ~m. It will also be
useful to define ~mA ≡ (mA − 1,mB) and ~mB ≡ (mA,mB − 1).
As a benchmark, we also consider the case in which there is only one alternative to the
status quo. The model is the same as before, with pi` = 0 for some ` = A,B. Because
there is a single leader, the state is just the number m of additional followers the leader
needs to win. The price is p(m), the value of an uncommitted follower w(m), the value
of a committed follower wout(m), and the leader’s value v(m).
4. Results in the Benchmark Model
4.1. Monopolistic Leadership. We begin by solving the model when there is a single
alternative. For convenience, we denote the game with a single alternative and initial
state m, Γs(m). We show that in this case there is a unique MPE, in which the leader
makes an offer in every meeting until she collects a majority of committed followers, and
the uncommitted followers who meet the leader accept these offers. This result allows us
to pin down the equilibrium payoff for a follower at the beginning of the game.
Let β0(m) denote the probability that a random follower meets the leader when the leader
has to secure the support of m additional followers. Note that in this case there are n+1
2
−m
committed followers and n−1
2
+m uncommitted followers, so β0(m) ≡ 2/(n− 1 + 2m).
7In Section 5.1 we consider the costly action case, in which w` < 0 for ` = A,B.
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Proposition 4.1. The game Γs(q) has a unique MPE. In this equilibrium, the payoff of
a follower is given by
w(q) =
(
q∏
m=1
r(m)
)
δqw for r(m) ≡ 1− β0(m)
1− δβ0(m)
The intuition for the proof can be seen in two steps. First, fix the proposed equilibrium.
Since v > 0 and w > 0, when the leader needs to collect the support of only one additional
follower (m = 1), the leader and the follower can create and capture a positive surplus by
moving forward. Thus, given full information, there is a price at which this transaction
occurs. Now consider the situation in which there are m followers remaining. Since in
equilibrium there is trade whenever the leader needs to secure the support of t < m
additional followers, then in state m there is also a positive surplus for the leader and
the selected follower to obtain if they move forward, and then again a price at which this
happens. This shows that the proposed strategy profile is an equilibrium.
By the same logic, in any equilibrium there must be a transaction when m = 1. Suppose
then that in equilibrium there is trade whenever the leader needs to secure the support
of t < m additional followers. Recall that in state m, in the proposed equilibrium there
is a positive surplus for the follower and the leader. Then if in state m the leader does
not make an offer with positive probability or the follower does not accept the offer with
positive probability, leader and follower would obtain a lower payoff in this state, and
thus the gain from moving forward would be higher. It follows that the leader will make
an offer, which the follower will accept.
Proposition 4.1 implies that in equilibrium the leader cannot extract all surplus from the
followers. The reason for this is similar to the logic behind under-provision of a public
good. Note that since the followers benefit from implementing the alternative to the
status quo when w > 0, the leader actually charges them to move on. By rejecting the
offer, however, a follower can rely on others to pay the bill. This generates an outside
option that gives each follower some bargaining power over the leader. Since the cost of
deferring implementation of the proposal decreases with δ, the value of the outside option
is increasing in δ, and so is the followers’ equilibrium payoff. In fact, as δ approaches 1,
r(m)→ 1 and w → w.
Note also that w(m)/w(m−1) = r(m)δ < 1. Thus the equilibrium payoff of uncommitted
followers increases as the leader gets closer to achieving the majority. This is not just due
to the effect of being closer to completion. Note that the value of committed followers is
given by wout(m) = δ
mw, so that wout(m)/wout(m − 1) = δ. It follows that the rate of
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growth of the value for uncommitted followers (as the leader gets closer to achieving a
majority) exceeds that of the committed followers.
4.2. Competition and Main Result. Consider now the competitive game Γc(q, q), with
two alternatives to the status quo, A and B, and initial position ~m = (q, q). Similarly to
the monopolistic case, in equilibrium a follower i will commit his support to a leader ` in
state ~m if and only if the leader and follower jointly benefit from this trade, taking the
joint continuation strategy of the remaining followers and both leaders as given.
Recall that we defined ~mA as the state that is one step from ~m in the direction of A,
~mA ≡ (mA − 1,mB) and similarly ~mB ≡ (mA,mB − 1). Follower i accepts an offer p`(~m)
from ` only if p`(~m) + δWout(~m
`) ≥ δW (~m), and accepts with probability one if this
inequality is strict. Thus in equilibrium, if ` makes an offer, she offers
(1) p∗`(~m) ≡ −δ[Wout(~m`)−W (~m)].
The offer by ` has to compensate i from the outside opportunities of refusing to commit
his support for `, taking him – along with the entire group – back to a position ~m. Leader
` is willing to make this offer if p∗`(~m) ≤ δ[V`(~m`) − V`(~m)], or substituting p∗`(~m) from
(1), if the surplus for i and ` for making ` one step closer to the goal is nonnegative; i.e.,
(2) S`(~m) ≡ [V`(~m`)− V`(~m)] + [Wout(~m`)−W (~m)] ≥ 0.
Given that whenever a transfer is made, it is determined by (1), we can consider, without
loss of generality, a transformed game in which each leader ` chooses in each state ~m
whether to offer p∗`(~m) to a follower or pass. A MPE is then fully characterized by the
probability γ`(~m) that leader ` = A,B makes an offer in each state ~m, and the probability
α`(~m) that an uncommitted follower accepts an offer p
∗
`(~m) from leader ` = A,B in each
state ~m. A (simplified) behavioral strategy σ = (~γ, ~α) is a MPE if given continuation
values computed using σ, for all uncommitted followers i ∈ N , leaders ` = A,B, and
feasible states ~m ≤ (q, q), we have (i) α`(~m) ∈ [0, 1] and (ii) γ`(~m) > 0⇒ S`(~m) ≥ 0 and
γ`(~m) < 1 ⇒ S`(~m) ≤ 0. In our next result we establish existence of a MPE (possibly
involving mixed strategies).
Proposition 4.2. The competitive game Γc(q, q) has a MPE.
In the natural extension of the equilibrium in the monopolistic case to the competitive
game, leaders make relevant offers in all states ~m such that mA,mB ≤ q. We call this
a fully competitive equilibrium. Differently than its counterpart in the monopoly game,
this strategy profile is not always an equilibrium in this context, as condition (2) is not
necessarily satisfied for both leaders in all states when followers anticipate that both
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leaders will make relevant offers in every state. On the other hand, given any parameter
values, if the leaders’ value of winning is large enough the strategy profile in which all
meetings result in transactions will be an equilibrium (Proposition 4.4 below).
To develop the intuition for our main results we begin our analysis of the competitive
environment focusing on a fully competitive equilibrium. This culminates in Theorem
4.5, where we establish the comparison between the competitive and monopolistic envi-
ronments for a fully competitive equilibrium. We then extend this result to all equilibria
in Theorem 4.6.
We start our analysis of fully competitive equilibria solving the three-follower example.
Example 4.3. Suppose n = 3. We solve this game by backward induction. Consider the
state ~m = (1, 1), reached after one follower has committed for each leader. From (1),
leader ` = A,B offers the follower p`(1, 1) = δ[W (1, 1)− w`], which the follower accepts.
Thus
W (1, 1) = piA (pA (1, 1) + δwA) + piB (pB (1, 1) + δwB) .
Substituting p`(1, 1), we find W (1, 1) = 0. Because only one follower remains uncom-
mitted there are no free riding possibilities and all surplus is extracted by the leaders.
Consider next the state ~m = (1, 2). As before, a follower meeting the leader gets a payoff
δW (1, 2), and thus
W (1, 2) =
1
2
δW (1, 2) +
1
2
(piAδwA + piBδW (1, 1))
Since W (1, 1) = 0, the follower only profits if he is able to free ride in ~m = (1, 2) and A
wins: W (1, 2) = (δpiA/(2− δ))wA > 0 = W (1, 1). Proceeding in the same manner we
have that W (2, 1) = (δpiB/(2− δ))wB and
W (2, 2) =
(
2δ2
3− δ
1
2− δ
)(
(piA)
2wA + (piB)
2wB
)

We can now easily compare the followers’ equilibrium payoff in the example with the payoff
of an uncommitted follower in the monopolistic leadership case. Note first that since
w(1) > 0 from Proposition 4.1, the previous example implies that W (1, 1) = 0 < w(1).
This situation is fairly special, though, since in the competitive game with ~m = (1, 1)
only one follower remains uncommitted and there are no free riding possibilities. Now,
from the single leader case we have,
w(2) =
(
2δ2
3− δ
1
2− δ
)
w
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Note that the expression in parenthesis is equal to the corresponding expression for
W (2, 2) above. Thus, if w = wA > wB or even w = wA = wB, followers prefer a
monopoly of A to competition between A and B, for any discount factor δ < 1. Moreover,
for ∆w = wA−wB small, followers also prefer a monopoly of B to competition if piA ≈ 1/2.
There are two important lessons to learn from this example. First, since a monopoly can
be preferred to competition even for δ → 1, the reason why followers are better off under
single leadership is not rooted on the fact that competition takes more expected time to
generate utility than single leadership. In particular it cannot be due to the fact that
delay may destroy some surplus. Second, because sometimes a monopoly of the worst
leader dominates competition, the reason behind the followers’ welfare ordering cannot
be due to the “risk” of ending up collectively selecting the worst choice available. We will
show that the source of the follower’s preferences for single leadership over competition
is rooted on how the bargaining power shifts across games.
Consider now a group of n followers. Let β(~m) denote the probability that any given
uncommitted follower meets with one of the leaders. Note if ` has to secure the support
of m` more followers there are (n+ 1)−mA−mB committed followers, and mA +mB − 1
uncommitted followers. Then β(~m) = 1/(mA + mB − 1). As in the examples, eq. (1)
implies that the expected payoff of a follower after meeting one of the leaders is δW (~m)
independently of whether he accepts the proposal or not. This is a crucial property, for
it allows us to decouple the system of partial difference equations for W (~m) and V`(~m),
` = A,B. Then
(3) W (~m) =
(
1
mA +mB − 1
)
δW (~m) +
(
mA +mB − 2
mA +mB − 1
)
δ
∑
`
pi`W (~m
`),
so that letting C(k) ≡ k−2
k−(1+δ) , we have
(4) W (~m) = C(mA+mB)δ
∑
`
pi`W (~m
`).
Equation (4) is a partial difference equation with end points W (mA, 0) = wB for mA > 0
and W (0,mB) = wA for mB > 0, which we can solve to obtain the particular solution
(5) W (~m) =
∑
j=A,B
(δpij)
mj ×
m−j−2∑
l=0
mj−1+l∏
k=0
C(m−j+mj−k)
×(mj− 1+l
mj−1
)
× (δpi−j)l
× wj ,
where we have adopted the convention that for any f(·), ∑bk=a f(k) = 0 whenever b < a.
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As the group moves closer to completion, there are two opposite effects on followers’ wel-
fare. On the one hand, getting closer to completion increases the value of an uncommitted
follower (since w` > 0 and δ < 1). On the other hand, it also results in a lower ability
to free ride. The value of an uncommitted follower in each state ~m depends on how
the tradeoff between proximity and free riding is resolved, as given by the probability of
successful free riding along alternative paths to a terminal state from the initial state ~m.
And the key point here is that not all paths to a terminal state have the same effect on
the probability of free riding. Thus, the followers’ value increases as we move closer to
completion while maximizing free riding possibilities. This is achieved by a lopsided win
of the leading principal, taking into consideration both the current balance of power and
expectations about future performance (see Figure 1). On the other hand, free riding
opportunities are minimized in tight races, where a principal wins by a small margin. In
fact, as we have seen in example 4.3, the leaders extract all surplus from an uncommitted
follower in state (1, 1), who has no free riding opportunities.
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Figure 1. W (·) in a CE, for n = 9, δ = 0.95 and pi` = 0.5, w` = 100 for ` = A,B.
Having obtained the expression forW (~m) in terms of the fundamentals, we can write down
equilibrium transfers. Note that once a follower is committed, all strategic considerations
are brushed aside, as a committed follower just needs to wait for a leader to form a
majority. Thus
(6) Wout (~m) =
∑
j=A,B
(δpij)
mj ×
(
m−j−1∑
l=0
(
mj − 1 + l
l
)
× (δpi−j)l
)
× wj
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From equation (1), expressions (5) and (6) pin down equilibrium transfers p`(~m) in terms
of the fundamentals. This in turn allows us to solve for the value of the leaders, which is
given, in recursive form, by
(7) V` (~m) = pi`
(
δV`
(
~m`
)− p` (~m))+ (1− pi`)δV` (~m−`)
Once we write transfers in terms of the primitives, (7) becomes a stand alone difference
equation, which we can solve as we did with W and Wout. This allows us to prove the
next result.
Proposition 4.4. All else equal, if the leaders’ payoff for winning is sufficiently high
(either v` or v` − v`), the game Γ(q, q) has a fully competitive equilibrium.8
We are now ready to state our first main result. In this theorem, we will assume that the
sufficient condition for the existence of a fully competitive equilibrium is satisfied, and
compare the value of uncommitted followers when there is a single alternative with the
value under competition. The theorem establishes that followers are better-off when only
the best alternative is available than under competition. This holds for any difference
in the value of the alternatives, and in fact also when the two alternatives give followers
the same value; i.e., wA = wB = w. Moreover, for any terminal values wA > 0 and
wB > 0, if the initial number of uncommitted followers is sufficiently large, then followers
are better-off under a monopoly of the worst alternative (say B) than under competition
between A and B.
Theorem 4.5. Let W (q, q) denote the payoff of an uncommitted follower in a fully com-
petitive equilibrium of the game with two alternatives A and B such that wA, wB > 0.
Then
W (q, q) < max {wA (q) , wB (q)} .
Moreover, (i) for any n, there exists ε(n) > 0 such that if |wA − wB| < ε(n), then
W (q, q) < min {wA (q) , wB (q)}, and (ii) there exists n such that in a fully competitive
equilibrium of the game with q = (n+ 1)/2 > n, W (q, q) < min {wA (q) , wB (q)}.
How can competition between alternatives be bad for followers? The key to understand
the result is to understand how followers’ bargaining power changes across the two games.
Consider the problem of the pivotal follower when there is a single alternative (the qth
member to meet the leader). If the pivotal follower refuses an offer by the leader, he will
8Note this equilibrium is inefficient, as the worst alternative wins with positive probability. This result is
in line with the literature on non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games with externalities, which has
shown that inefficiency is the norm in these class of games (Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999), Ray
and Vohra (2001), Gomes (2005), Gomes and Jehiel (2005)).
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be able to free ride on others with probability (q− 1)/q = (n− 1)/(n+ 1). This relatively
high free-riding ability gives the pivotal follower considerable bargaining power against
the leader and protects him from getting fully expropriated.
Now consider the problem of a pivotal follower under competition (a follower who could
give one of the leaders a win). The number of uncommitted followers in this situation
is at most as large as in the single alternative case and generally lower. In fact, if the
battle between the leaders is even until the end, the pivotal follower could meet the leader
in state ~m = (1, 1). But here there are no free riding possibilities; i.e., if the follower
rejects an offer he meets one of the leaders again for sure. As we discussed earlier, this
gives the pivotal follower no bargaining power, so W (1, 1) = 0. This situation is extreme,
but the logic generalizes to other states in which the number of uncommitted followers is
lower than in the single alternative case. In most states, competition between the leaders
gives the pivotal follower fewer free-riding possibilities, and results in a lower equilibrium
payoff.
To illustrate this point, consider the competitive and monopolistic games with five fol-
lowers. Using Proposition 4.1 and equation (5), and simplifying, w(3) > W (3, 3) if and
only if
(8) w >
∑
j=A,B
(pij)
3
[
1 +
3
2− δ (δpi−j)
]
wj
The expected payoff for followers under competition can be divided in three terms. First
is the payoff from events in which one principal wins without conceding a single vote. This
is captured by the first term in the bracket. This term involves no discounting because
reaching terminal nodes does not take additional periods than under monopoly. Second
is the payoff from maximally divided wins, where a principal wins conceding two votes.
These terms do not contribute to followers’ payoffs because they eliminate free riding
opportunities (must go through the node (1, 1)). Third are the (three) events in which
one of the principals wins conceding one vote. This is the second term in the bracket. The
algebra isolates two conceptually distinct effects. One, captured by the discount factor δ
in the numerator, is simply the inefficiency brought by delay, given that these paths waste
a period in an unnecessary transaction. The other measures how free-riding opportunities
affect bargaining power. This is captured by the 2− δ term in the denominator.
Both delay and free-riding vanish as δ → 1, because patience eliminates the source of
power that free-riding gives to the followers. However, these are two distinct effects. In
fact, delay is not necessary for the result. To see this, let γ(~m) denote the probability of
reaching the node ~m from the initial node (q, q) in a competitive equilibrium. If we let
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wA = wB = w and rearrange, we can write (8) as
(1− δ) [γ(2, 1) + γ (1, 2) + γ (1, 1)] + 1
2
δγ (1, 1) > 0
Note that as δ → 1 all terms vanish except ~m = (1, 1), in which the remaining follower
has no opportunity to free-ride.
This logic is also at the heart of the second result. Consider again the single alternative
case. As we noted above, the probability that the pivotal uncommitted follower will be
able to free ride after refusing an offer from the leader is (n− 1)/(n+ 1). This probability
goes to one as n→∞. On the other hand, the game with competition can be very close.
Thus, even if n is large, the pivotal player can be one of only a few uncommitted followers,
and as a result have few free-riding opportunities, and therefore less bargaining power.
This effect trickles down all the way through to the beginning of the game, and then even
a monopoly of the worst alternative is preferred to competition. Interestingly, this result
holds for any difference in the value of the alternatives to the followers, as long as the
group is sufficiently large.
Theorem 4.5 shows that if the conditions are such that both leaders compete for sup-
port in every state, introducing competition reduces followers’ welfare. Differently to the
monopolistic leadership case, however, the equilibrium of the two leader game will not
necessarily be fully competitive. In fact, for some parameter values any MPE will neces-
sarily involve mix strategies. The question then arises as to whether our result is specific
to the fully competitive equilibrium or instead holds for any MPE.
Our next result addresses this issue. Exploiting incentive compatibility conditions that
must hold in any MPE, we show that whenever an alternative A provides equal or larger
value to followers than a second alternative B (wA ≥ wB), followers are better off when a
single principal advocates in favor of A than when principals for A and B compete with
one another to attain the support of a majority of the followers. This is the main result
of the paper.
Theorem 4.6. Let W (q, q) denote the payoff of an uncommitted follower in a MPE of the
game with two alternatives A and B such that wA ≥ wB > 0. Then (i) W (q, q) < wA (q).
Moreover, (ii) there exists ε > 0 such that if wA − wB < ε, W (q, q) < wB (q).
The proof is by induction and consists of four steps:
(1) First, we show, within the competitive game, that in any state ~m there is always
an alternative j ∈ {A,B} such that followers are better off after moving one step
in the direction of j; i.e., W (~m) < maxj∈{A,B} {W (~mj)}.
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(2) Second, we show that when a principal j is one step away from winning the
competitive game followers would be strictly better off by removing one of the
alternatives from consideration; e.g., W (mA, 1) < max{wA (mA) , wB (1)}. This
step connects the competitive and monopolistic games.
(3) Third, combining steps 1 and 2 we then show that when principal j is two
steps away from winning the competitive game followers would be strictly bet-
ter off removing one of the alternatives from consideration; e.g., W (mA, 2) <
max {wA (mA) , wB (2)} for all mA ≥ 2.
(4) Fourth, we establish the induction step for ~m ≥ (3, 3): if W (~m`) ≤ w` (m` − 1)
and W
(
~m`
) ≤ w−` (m−`) for ` = A,B, then W (~m) ≤ max {wA (mA) , wB (mB)}.
Iterative application of the induction step covers the entire state space and estab-
lishes the result.
Theorem 4.6 makes clear that the comparison between competition and monopoly does
not depend on the selection of a fully competitive equilibrium in the competitive game.
Thus, in particular, the comparison holds not only when leaders’ value of winning is
large, but for any feasible parameter configuration. The sketch of the proof of Theorem
4.6 also makes clear that the comparison holds not only in the diagonal (states ~m such
that mA = mB) but in the entire state space. Thus, the presence of an initial advantage
would not alter our results.
Corollary 4.7. Consider any equilibrium of the game Γ(qA, qB), where qA < qB. Then (i)
W (qA, qB) < max {wA (qA) , wB (qB)}. Moreover, (ii) there exists n s.t. if n < qA < qB,
in a fully competitive equilibrium of Γ(qA, qB), W (qA, qB) < min {wA (qA) , wB (qB)}.
Note moreover that this allows us to extend the benchmark model to arbitrary q-rules.
Suppose for example that B needs to obtain the support of a supermajority qB > (n+1)/2
of members to implement a reform leading to a value of wB > 0 for the followers, while A
can block the reform by getting the support of qA = n− qB members, leading to wA = 0.
Note that the model for an arbitrary non-unanimous q-rule is formally equivalent to
introducing initial advantages, with the exception that wA = 0. Thus part (i) of Remark
4.7 applies to this case as stated. However, since wA = 0, part (ii) of the remark does not
necessarily hold.9
An alternative conceptualization of q-rules, which is occasionally used in the literature,
would require both principals i = A,B to obtain qi 6= (n + 1)/2 votes to win. This
9With a strict public good (wA > 0), wA (m) > 0 for any state m ≥ 1. In the proof of Theorem 4.5
we show that for any wA (qA) > 0 we can choose (qA, qB) large enough so that the fully competitive
equilibrium value W (qA, qB) can be sandwiched in (0, wA). When wA = 0, however, wA (qA) = 0 as well,
and then W (qA, qB) > wA (qA).
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alternative supermajority model is interesting because it brings light to the discussion of
delay vs free-riding. With a supermajority, qi > (n+1)/2, there are now multiple states in
which there is a single uncommitted follower, and hence more states in which all surplus is
extracted from this last surviving uncommitted follower. This effect will trickle down the
recursion now with more force, and monopoly will be preferred to competition even for
δ → 1. With submajorities qi < (n+ 1)/2, instead, there is no state that eliminates free-
riding opportunities completely. Thus when δ → 1, the value of free riding opportunities
vanishes, and followers are indifferent between monopoly and competition.
5. Applications and Extensions
In Section 4 we presented a bare bones model of dynamic competition with irreversible
actions. This simple model allowed us to focus on the core mechanism behind our result.
To take the theory to applications, however, we must adapt the model to incorporate
various new features. In the next sections we do this, illustrating the results in each
case with clear applications of the model. For simplicity, we assume throughout that the
leaders place a sufficiently high value on winning, so that the competitive game has a fully
competitive equilibrium.
5.1. Costly Actions. In the benchmark model we assumed that the alternatives cham-
pioned by the leaders are a “public good”, in the sense that followers prefer the outcome
associated with a victory of A or B to the status quo. In some instances, though, it is nat-
ural to assume that the actions under consideration are costly for members of the group,
in the sense that followers would prefer the status quo to any of the options proposed by
the leaders; i.e., wA, wB < 0. The costly action model can naturally arise in multiple set-
tings, as in vote buying (when a committee considers proposals that members find worse
than the status quo), exclusive deals (see our example in Section 5.2), and coalitions for
war (if decision-makers in each country favor inaction).
Here we extend our analysis to consider the case of wA, wB < 0. As before, we begin with
the case in which there is only one alternative to the status quo. We show that as long
as the leader’s payoff for winning is sufficiently high, or players are sufficiently patient,
the game Γs(q) has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the leader makes an offer
whenever she meets an uncommitted follower up to the point in which she wins.
Proposition 5.1. Let w < 0. All else equal, if the leader’s payoff for winning is suffi-
ciently high or players are sufficiently patient, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition
4.1 remains the unique MPE of the game Γs(q), and followers’ equilibrium payoff is given
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by
w(q) =
(
q∏
m=1
r(m)
)
δqw < 0 with r(m) ≡ 1− β0(m)
1− δβ0(m)
Proposition 5.1 says that if followers are sufficiently patient, the leader can implement a
policy that is arbitrarily bad for followers with the support of a majority of the group.
This of course is terrible news for those agents who are not compensated.
The reason for this result is that the leader uses uncommitted followers against each other.
Upon meeting, both leader and follower know that if the follower rejects the leader’s offer,
the next follower will accept it. Thus, the follower can only delay the implementation of
the costly action for one period, if he forgoes any compensation. To prevent this delay, the
leader can offer to compensate the follower for this differential (and not for the full cost
that implementation will bring to the follower). Note that since the power of the follower
stems from his ability to delay implementation, it is decreasing in the followers’ discount
factor δ. In fact, from Proposition 4.1, w(q) attains an upper bound of zero as δ → 0, and
a lower bound of w < 0 as δ → 1. This implies that as transaction frictions vanish and
the time in between meetings vanishes, followers’ expected compensation goes to zero.
In the costly actions model patience increases the bargaining power of the principal, and
allows her to exploit agents, even without using discriminating contracts.
Would followers benefit from competition between principals in this context? As one
might anticipate, the answer is yes: with costly actions, competition increases followers’
welfare.
Proposition 5.2. Consider any equilibrium of the game with two costly alternatives
inducing payoffs wA, wB < 0 for the followers, and initial position (q, q), where q ≡
(n + 1)/2. Then W (q, q) ≥ min {wA (q) , wB (q)}. Moreover, (ii) there exists n such
that in a fully competitive equilibrium of the game with q = (n + 1)/2 > n, W (q, q) ≥
max {wA (q) , wB (q)}.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. With costly actions, followers can only cut
their loses if they are part of the coalition that supports the leader. Thus, the same logic
in Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 now reverses the result: a pivotal agent that refuses the offer
with a single alternative will have a much lower chance of being brought back to the table
of negotiations than a pivotal follower in a competitive environment, and as a result can
demand a higher transfer in exchange of his support. Formally, the proof of this result is
identical to that of Theorems 4.5 and 4.6, reversing inequalities due to W (·) < 0.10
10By the same logic, it follows that if one of the leaders proposes a public good and one of them champions
a costly action, say wA > 0 ≥ wB , then followers prefer ΓsA(q) & ΓcA(q) & ΓsB(q).
COMPETING FOR LOYALTY 19
5.2. Insiders, Outsiders and Rivals. In the benchmark model we assumed that the
net-of-transfers payoff that followers obtain when an alternative ` = A,B wins is w`,
independently of who, if anybody, they had decided to support. In applications, however,
it can be more natural – or even necessary – to distinguish between the insider payoff
obtained by an individual who gave her support to a leader when that leader wins, the
outsider payoff obtained by an uncommitted follower when a leader wins, and – in the
competitive model – the rival payoff obtained by an individual who gave her support to
a principal when the opposite principal wins. Consider for example the following passage
from “HRC”, the book on Hillary Clinton by Politico’s Jonathan Allen and The Hill’s
Amie Parnes:
“They carefully noted who had endorsed Hillary, who backed Barack Obama,
and who stayed on the sidelines – standard operating procedure for any
high-end political organization. But the data went into much more nu-
anced detail . . . . For Hillary, whose loss was not the end of her political
career, the spreadsheet was a necessity of modern political warfare, an
improvement on what old-school politicians called a favor file. It meant
that when asks rolled in, she and Bill would have at their fingertips all
the information needed to make a quick decision – including extenuating,
mitigating, and amplifying factors – so that friends could be rewarded and
enemies punished.”
Capturing this situation requires that we distinguish between the insider payoff zA ob-
tained by a party boss who supported Mrs Clinton if she succeeds, the rival payoff yA
obtained by a party boss who supported Mr Obama if Mrs. Clinton wins, and the out-
sider payoff wA obtained by a party boss who stayed on the sidelines if Mrs Clinton wins.
Similarly, consider the exclusive contracting setup. Suppose that two incumbents try to
convince buyers to sign exclusive contracts, but only that who obtains more than half
of the market can prevail. Then a buyer who signs an exclusive deal with company A
obtains a payoff of zA > 0 if A wins, but yA < zA if B wins, due to adjustment costs.
A similar distinction can be made in setups in which there is a single principal. Consider
for example a real estate developer who wants to buy properties in a block to build a
shopping center. Assume, for simplicity, that the shopping center can be built if and
only if the developer acquires at least half of the houses in the block (independently of
location), and normalize the value of each house if the mall is not built to zero. If an
owner does not sell the house and the mall is built, the house has a loss of value w < 0. If,
on the other hand, the owner does sell the house to the developer, the value of his assets
changes by z < w ! Again, capturing this situation requires that we distinguish between
the insider payoff z obtained by an owner who gave her support to the developer when
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the developer succeeds, the outsider payoff w obtained by an uncommitted owner when
the developer succeeds, and the status quo payoff (zero).
The central application we consider in this section is corporate takeovers. The free-riding
that is central to our paper is also at the core of the seminal Grossman and Hart (1980)
paper. Grossman and Hart (GH) analyze a situation in which a company or individual
(the raider) acquires shares of a target company in order to control its board of directors.
It is assumed that the raider can improve the value of the company. To capture this, we
assume that under the raider’s control the value of a share is w > 0, and normalize the
value of a share under the incumbent management to zero. In GH, the raider buys shares
by announcing a tender price p at which he is willing to buy all shares tendered to him,
and wins control of the firm if more than 50 % of the shares are tendered to her. It is
assumed that in making his tender decision, each shareholder ignores his impact on the
outcome of the bid.
In this context, GH show that – since shareholders that do not sell can capture the increase
in value brought by the raider – any shareholder who thinks that the raid will succeed
with certainty will not tender his shares at a price p < w. Thus, in equilibrium the
potential raider does not attempt the takeover, even when it has a value advantage (for
a raid to succeed the raider needs to offer p ≥ w, but under these conditions the raider
makes no profit).
In order to capture the main source of the externality in the GH model within our model,
we need to distinguish the payoff of a shareholder who does not sell to the raider if the
raider wins (w > 0) form the payoff of a shareholder who sells to the raider if the raider
wins (z = 0). With this amendment, we can consider our version of the GH takeover
problem. There are of course structural differences within the two models. In particular,
instead of a tender price p at which the raider is willing to buy all shares tendered to him,
as in GH, we assume that the raider approaches shareholders sequentially, possibly offering
different prices to each shareholder (as in GH and Segal (2003), we assume shareholders
are homogeneous). Moreover, differently than GH, we suppose that shareholders are fully
aware of the effect of their action on the outcome of the raid attempt.11
What does this model say about takeovers? To attack this question while at the same
time setting up the framework for other applications, we analyze the general version of the
model and return to our takeover application shortly. We denote the values of leaders and
followers with a hat, to distinguish them from the analogous quantities in the benchmark
model.
11Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992) show that when shareholdings are divisible the free-riding problem
does not prevent the takeover process in the GH model.
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Assume first that – as in our benchmark model – there is an equilibrium in which the
leader makes relevant offers to followers in all states m ≤ q. Because the equilibrium
transfer is such that the follower is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer,
the equilibrium payoff of a follower meeting the leader in state m is δwˆ(m), independently
of whether he accepts or rejects the leader’s offer. As a result, the recursive representation
of the value of uncommitted followers is unchanged from the benchmark game, and thus
so is its solution, wˆ(m) = (
∏m
k=1 r(m)) δ
mw. The value of a committed follower, on the
other hand, changes in the obvious way, so that now it is given by wˆout (m) = δ
mz. In
particular, if z = 0 as in the takeover model, we have wout (m) = 0. Substituting in the
equilibrium transfers, this directly implies that
(9) pˆ(m) =
[
m∏
k=1
r(k)
]
δm+1w > 0,
where as before r(m) = (n + 2m − 3)/(n + 2m − 1 − 2δ), so that transfers from the
raider to shareholders are positive even as w > 0. In fact, pˆ(m)→ w for all m as δ → 1.
Thus, as frictions vanish, the raider has to fully compensate shareholders for the increase
in the value of the company under her management, as in GH. For any δ < 1, however,
pˆ(m) < w, and the raider can appropriate some of the surplus it generates.12 Moreover,
note that from (9), we have
pˆ(m− 1)− pˆ(m) = (1− r(m)δ)
[
m−1∏
k=1
r(k)
]
δmw > 0
Thus, the price curve (intertemporal price discrimination) is strictly decreasing in m, so
that shareholders who transact first with the raider obtain a lower price for their shares.13
Would shareholders benefit from introducing competition between raiders? In the bench-
mark model we saw that whenever the principals added value, competition was detrimen-
tal to followers’ welfare. But while transfers from the principals to the agents were always
negative with public goods, in the generalized environment public goods can coexist with
12This result is similar to that of Harrington and Prokop (1993), who consider a dynamic version of GH
in which the raider can reproach the shareholders who have not sold (taking all offers at the posted price
in each period). This setup leads to a “Coase conjecture” result, in which the raider’s profit is diluted
for large discount factors.
13The fact that in the extended model leaders might have to hand out positive transfers to followers
(depending on the value of z vs w) suggests that the strategy profile in which the leader makes relevant
offers in all states m ≥ 1 might fail to be an equilibrium for some parameter values. Indeed, the condition
for existence is violated when the outsider payoff w is high relative to both the insider payoff z and the
leader payoff v. As before, however, this strategy profile is an equilibrium for any w if v is sufficiently
large. It is also an equilibrium (ii) whenever v > 0 and z > w, (iii) whenever v > 0 > w, and (iv)
whenever z = 0 and v ≥ qw. Part (iv) applies in the case of the corporate takeover. Thus, we predict
raids will occur whenever the raider has a positive quality differential with the incumbent management.
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positive transfers from the principals to the followers. Thus it is not immediately obvi-
ous whether or not competition among principals could be valuable for followers in this
environment.
The fact is that our main result is not affected by the direction of transfers: with public
goods, competition is still detrimental to followers’ welfare. The key is that – as it was the
case in the monopolistic environment – in the competitive environment each leader i makes
offers to fully extract the joint surplus generated by moving one step in her direction. As a
result, the value of a follower when he meets a leader is δWˆ (~m), independently of whether
he accepts or rejects the leader’s offer. Because of this, the recursive representation of the
followers value Wˆ is given by (4), exactly as before, and thus Wˆ (~m) = W (~m).
This implies that the followers’ value only depends on the outsider payoffs w`, with all the
new elements going into the “revised” cash transfer pˆ`(~m). It follows that to determine
whether we are in a “public good” or a “costly action” model, we only need to consider
the outsider payoffs w`: if w` < 0 competition is beneficial for followers, and if w` > 0,
competition is detrimental for followers. In the case of takeovers, in particular, this says
that shareholders would not benefit from competition between raiders.
Now consider the value of cash transfers. The amount leader ` will offer to a follower
when meeting in a state ~m satisfies
(10) pˆ`(~m) = δ
[
W (~m)− Wˆ `out(~m`)
]
,
where pˆ`(~m) is the cash transfer ` proposes in state ~m, where Wˆ
`
out(~m
`) is the value in state
~m` of a follower who committed his support to leader `, and where we have used the fact
that Wˆ (~m) = W (~m) for all ~m. In the benchmark model we had Wout(~m
`) =
∑
` J`(~m)w`
for some J`(·). In the current setting instead Wˆ `out(~m`) = J`(~m`)z` + Ji(~m`)yi for i 6= `.
Thus substituting,
(11) pˆ`(~m) = p`(~m)− δ
[
J`(~m
`)(z` − w`) + Ji(~m`)(yi − wi)
]
Note that when J`(~m
`)(z`−w`) < Jj(~m`)(wj−yj), prices are higher than in the benchmark
model. That is, transfers are higher than in the benchmark model when the weighted gain
from committing to the winner is larger than the weighted gain to not committing to the
loser. In particular, in the takeover model we have that if one of raiders j = A,B buys
a shareholder out, the (ex) shareholder is excluded from any benefits the company can
produce, so zj = yj = 0. Thus prices are higher than in the benchmark model. Moreover,
note that in this case we actually have Wˆ `out(~m
`) = J`(~m
`)z` + Ji(~m
`)yi = 0, so that
pˆ`(~m) = δW (~m) > 0
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As this example illustrates, in the model with insiders, outsiders and rivals the equivalence
between the effect of competition and the direction of the transfers breaks down. This
might seem disconcerting. Since the intuition for the result in the benchmark model relied
heavily on free riding, it can be difficult at first glance to reconcile competition being bad
for followers with positive transfers from the leaders to the followers.
Once we separate real from nominal compensation, the main idea is unchanged. In the
original model, with no “bonus payments” (no insider/outsider differential) the only pos-
sible compensation to/from followers is in cash. Thus when followers receive a positive
cash transfer, meeting the leader is good for followers, and when in equilibrium followers
give a transfer to the leader, avoiding the leader is good for followers. But when the payoff
of insiders, outsiders and rivals differ, the total compensation (or taxation) is composed of
both cash and a “bonus” (the insider/outsider differential). In this context, focusing on
the cash component of total compensation can be misleading, as this can go in any direc-
tion, but total compensation (cash and bonus) will have the same informational content
as before: when total compensation is positive, followers want to meet the leader, and
when total compensation is negative, they want to avoid them. To see this more clearly,
note that
Wˆ `out(~m
`) = Wout(~m
`) + J`(~m
`)(z` − w`) + Jj(~m`)[yj − wj] for j 6= `.
Thus, substituting in (10), we have that
(12) δ[W (~m)−Wout(~m`)] = pˆ`(~m) + J`(~m`)(z` − w`) + Jj(~m`)(yj − wj).︸ ︷︷ ︸
T`(~m)
T`(~m) is the total compensation, in both cash and “goodies”, that a follower obtains
from ` in exchange of his support in state ~m. Here pˆ`(~m) is the cash component, and
J`(~m
`)(z` − w`) + Jj(~m`)(yj − wj) is the discounted net expected increment in goodies,
(z` − w`) being the insider’s gain (the increment in goodies the follower gets when being
with ` if ` wins, relative to being uncommitted), and (yj − wj) is the rival’s loss.
The key point that (12) illustrates is that the total transfer T`(~m) is exactly the same as
the value of the cash transfer in the benchmark model, when no goodies are available.
What matters is not the direction of the cash transfers but the total compensation, which
is pinned down by δ[W (~m) −Wout(~mA)], and is therefore unrelated to z` and yj. This
generalizes in a natural way our previous intuition. In a public good environment the
total compensation (excluding policy gains) T`(~m) will be negative, and followers extract
a free rider surplus when they can avoid meeting the leaders. Thus, competition – which
reduces the free riding opportunities – is not beneficial for followers. With costly actions,
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instead, meeting the leaders allows followers to extract a positive total compensation, and
therefore competition increases their equilibrium payoff.14
The generalized model allows us to extend the insights of this paper to a wide range of
applications:
Vote Buying. Consider a national legislature, which is about to vote on a fiscal restraint
bill proposed by the executive. We assume that legislators – who understand the dire
state of fiscal affairs for the state – privately favor the bill (w > 0). Voters, however,
oppose it, so that supporting the bill is costly for legislators; i.e., z < 0 < w. Then
pˆ(m) = δm+1
([
m∏
k=1
r(k)
]
w − z
)
> 0,
so that the executive effectively buys legislators’ support with a positive transfer. More-
over, as in corporate takeovers, here pˆ(m − 1) > pˆ(m), so that legislators who commit
their support early obtain a smaller transfer than those who commit their support in later
stages. Now suppose that legislators face two options. The executive’s proposal (say A)
aims to reduce the deficit by increasing taxes, while an alternative proposal favored by
a powerful lobby (B) seeks to reduce public expenditures. We assume that legislators
prefer increasing taxes, so that wA > wB > 0. Our main result implies that in this case
legislators would be better off in the absence of the lobbyist. Still, both the executive and
the lobbyist offer legislators positive transfers.
Endorsements. Consider the endorsement game we discussed at the top of this section.
We argued that capturing this situation requires that we distinguish between the insider
payoff zA obtained by a party boss who supported Mrs Clinton if she succeeds, the rival
payoff yA obtained by a party boss who supported Mr Obama if Mrs. Clinton wins,
and the outsider payoff wA obtained by a party boss who stayed on the sidelines if Mrs
Clinton wins. In this example, we assume that for both j = A,B, zj > wj (supporters
are rewarded) and wj > yj (enemies are punished). In addition, we assume that both
contenders are good candidates, so that wj > 0 for j = A,B. In this case, promises flow
from the candidates to party members if the cost of supporting the losing candidate is
sufficiently large and from members to candidates otherwise, but party members always
prefer to have a shoo-in candidate (competition is detrimental for followers’ welfare).
14The previous remark also clarifies that the implicit assumption that followers cannot single-handedly
give their support to a principal, which can be awkward in the benchmark model, is not an issue in
most cases of interest. Here followers get a negative total compensation by meeting the leader, which
is partially mitigated by the positive transfer. By offering their support unilaterally, followers would
only be forgoing surplus. This can be seen most clearly in our application to corporate takeovers, where
shareholders would certainly lose by offering their shares to the raider for free. Thanks to David Ahn for
pointing this out.
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Exclusive Deals. We consider a problem in which two firms compete for the market of
a product with increasing returns to scale signing exclusive contracts with buyers. This
problem relates to the analysis in Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley Jr (1991) and Segal
and Whinston (2000), with two key differences. First, while in these papers only the
incumbent can sign exclusive contracts, and the challenger decides to enter or not after
all buyers have made their decision, we allow both firms to sign exclusive contracts. For
consistency with this first choice, we assume that both firms are initially competing in
the market. Thus, ours is a model where firms take actions to induce exit, as opposed to
a model of a single incumbent trying to deter entry.
To illustrate, consider the HD optical disc format war between Blu-ray and HD-DVD,
in which Sony (Blu-ray) and Toshiba (HD-DVD) were courting movie studios for their
exclusive support. Before the first movie releases in 2006, each format had the informal
support of three of the Big Six studios: HD-DVD had Universal Studios, Paramount Pic-
tures, and Warner Brothers Pictures, while Blu-ray Disc had Columbia Pictures, Disney,
and 20th Century Fox. Shortly after, however, Sony reportedly put together various deals
that reshaped the initial alliances.
“Warner actually wanted to go HD-DVD. They gave Toshiba the chance
to bring another studio into the HD-DVD camp before they turned Blu.
Fox was lined up, and told the HD-DVD camp it was going to switch to
HD-DVD, which would’ve also turned Warner exclusively HD-DVD. At the
last possible minute, it nixed the deal. [Pittsburgh Post columnist] Don
Lindich says it’s because Fox received a reported $120 million payout from
Sony to stay Blu-ray – Warner then switched and received between $400
and $500 million for its defection.”15
Following Warner’s decision to “go Blu” in January of 2008, Wal-Mart, Best-Buy and
Netflix each then decided to phase out HD-DVD. On mid February of 2008, Toshiba
announced it would cease developing, manufacturing and marketing HD-DVD players.
The generalized model allows us to capture this application quite naturally. Suppose A is
the better technology. Then yA ≥ yB and zA = wA ≥ zB = wB. Note here zj = wj, unless
there is an economic advantage of being an early supporter (which we assume here is not
the case). Because of adjustment costs, we have zj > yj for j = A,B, and because buyers’
prices will go up after one of the incumbents is pushed out, we can assume 0 > zj > yj
for j = A,B. Then transfers are
pˆ`(~m) = p`(~m) + δJi(~m
`)(wi − yi)
15The Real Reason Warner Went Blu-ray (1/14/08), by Matt Buchanan.
(http://gizmodo.com/344680/the-real-reason-warner-went-blu-ray).
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Since 0 = J`(~m
`)(z`−w`) < Jj(~m`)(wj−yj), transfers from the principals are higher than
in the benchmark model, and thus positive. However, since wj < 0, competition increases
followers’ welfare. What makes this a costly actions model is the fact that a monopolist
would increase prices for buyers. In addition to this price effect there could be a growth
effect, in which the size of the market grows markedly after consolidation. In fact, this
seems to have been the case in the HD-DVD / Blu-Ray war. This growth effect could
well overturn the negative price effect. In this case, we would have zj > wj > 0, and
competition would reduce followers’ welfare.
5.3. Contingent Transfers. So far we have assumed that leaders offer instantaneous
cash transfers in exchange for a commitment of support. Transfers that occurred in the
past are sunk, and hence do not affect the incentives in subsequent periods. Alternatively
one can assume that the leader and the follower agree on a contingent transfer in exchange
for support; a “partnership” offer instead of a buyout. This in fact seems the most
appropriate assumption in some applications, as in the case of endorsements by party
elders in presidential primaries. In this case candidates negotiate with party elders their
support, but they do so in exchange of future promises.
As it was the case with previous extensions, substituting cash for promises can change
the conditions for existence of a fully competitive equilibrium, but does not alter the
conclusions regarding the ranking of competition and monopoly. Let W˜out(~m
′|pj(~m))
denote the value in state ~m′ = (m′A,m
′
B) of a committed follower locked with a promise
pj(~m) acquired towards leader j in state ~m = (mA,mB). Note that
W˜out(~m
′|pA(~m)) =
∑
t
Pr (j wins in t periods | ~m′) δt[wj + pj(~m)]
+
∑
t
Pr (` wins in t periods | ~m′) δtw`
= Wout(~m
′) +
∑
t
Pr (j wins in t periods | ~m′) δtpj(~m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p˜j(~m′, ~m)
,
(13)
where Wout(~m
′) denotes the value of a committed follower in state ~m′ in the cash game,
and p˜j(~m
′, ~m) gives the expected value of the contingent transfer pj(~m) in state ~m′. Note
then that the value function W˜out(~m
′|p`(~m)) is separable in transfers and the value derived
from implementing the alternative. Thus when ` meets an uncommitted follower in state
~m, she offers a contingent payment p`(~m) such that
(14) p˜`(~m
`, ~m) + δWout(~m
`) = δW˜ (~m)
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This implies that the continuation payoff of a follower after he meets one of the leaders is
δW˜ (~m) no matter what, and therefore the recursive representation of W˜ (~m) is given by
(3) as in the “cash” game, so that W˜ (q, q) = W (q, q); i.e., the value of the uncommitted
follower at the beginning of the promises game is equal to the value in the cash game.
This moreover implies by (14) that the expected value of the payment in the promise
game is the same as in the cash game.
Now, to evaluate existence of a fully competitive equilibrium (for our large n results),
we need to consider the value of the leader. And in this regard there is in fact a crucial
difference with the benchmark cash model. Note that since promises are executed if
and only when the leader wins, present exchanges now affect the incentives for future
exchanges and must be incorporated on the value function. In particular, the relevant
state in the promises game is composed of the number of additional followers that each
leader needs in order to win, as before, but now also the stock of promises that a leader
brings to the table when meeting another follower.
This difference complicates the algebra, but does not alter our main results. To see this
note that after a leader wins, she obtains a payoff composed of a direct benefit v` and a
transfer from/to all committed followers. These two components are, indeed, additively
separable. Moreover, this property still holds recursively, which implies that the value
function of the leader in any state – now with the stock of promises as part of the state
– is also additively separable in the utility for winning and the promises collected if and
when she wins. It follows immediately that Proposition 4.4 extends to this case and a
fully competitive equilibrium exists for sufficiently high υ or υ − υ. A similar argument
holds for the monopoly case, and the welfare comparison in the paper holds.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a
single monopolistic principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members
of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents’ decisions to
support an alternative are irreversible and agents negotiate and commit their support to
the principal sequentially.
A danger for the agents in this context is that a principal may be able to poach agents to
her side by exploiting competition among members of the group. Would agents benefit
from introducing competition between opposing principals? We show that when the prin-
cipals’ policy provides value to the agents, competition reduces agents’ welfare. The key
to this result is the concept of free-riding at the core of the literature on contracting with
externalities. Competition hurts agents because it reduces their free-riding opportunities.
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In the main part of the paper we worked with a stripped down model in which followers’
payoffs in terminal nodes are unaffected by whether they supported the eventual winner,
the eventual loser, or remained uncommitted. In Section 5.2 we generalize this model,
allowing followers’ payoffs to depend on whether each follower backed a winning or los-
ing candidate. The generalized model allows us to extend the insights of this paper to
a wide range of applications, including corporate takeovers, vote buying, endorsements,
and exclusive deals. The key point that holds in all versions of the model is that compe-
tition hurts followers when it reduces free riding opportunities. Equivalently, competition
reduces agents’ welfare if and only if the principals’ policy provide value to what Segal
(1999) calls non-traders ; i.e., to agents who did not commit their support in favor or
against the principal.
Two issues are left for future work. First, in our analysis we assumed that it is always
the leaders who can make proposals to the followers. This assumption is prevalent in
the literature on contracting with externalities (see Genicot and Ray (2006), Rasmusen,
Ramseyer, and Wiley Jr (1991), Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994), Segal (1999, 2003),
Segal and Whinston (2000), and Mo¨ller (2007)) and is invoked here for simplicity. In
our sequential model, however, the assumption also carries conceptual grip. This was
recognized by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley Jr (1991), who note (footnote 4) that
“relaxing this assumption raises the danger of extortion by the crucial customers, who
could demand all of the second-period monopoly profits for an agreement not to patronize
the rival.”
This hold up problem is also present in our model when followers have sufficient proposal
power.16 Consider for simplicity the monopolistic model when followers have all proposal
power. In this case, the principal knows that the pivotal follower will always be able to
extract all winning prize v. Anticipating this, her willingness to pay in any state m > 1
is zero. When the winning prize v or the discount factor δ are large enough, this hold-
up problem induces an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which meetings in m > 1 are
unsuccessful with positive probability. The endogenous positive probability of a failure of
negotiations delays the arrival of the only profitable state for followers, making followers
in prior states indifferent between waiting or making the principal a relevant offer.
The hold-up problem in this context is certainly interesting, but basically orthogonal
to the free-riding effect we study in this paper. With arbitrary proposal power to the
followers, the comparison between monopoly and competition will naturally depend on
how hold-up affects the comparison between monopoly and competition, and on the weight
16Suppose that in any bilateral meeting, leaders make proposals with probability ψ ∈ (0, 1), followers
with probability 1 − ψ. By continuity, giving followers little bargaining power (i.e., ψ → 1) does not
change our results (a proof of this result is available upon request).
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of the two effects. This opens the possibility that if hold-up were to favor competition,
competition might be preferred to monopoly when followers have a relatively high ability
to make proposals to principals, even with public goods. We leave a full characterization
of the net effect with arbitrary proposal power for future research.
The second issue that we have left for future work is a systematic treatment of heterogene-
ity among followers. The difficulty of introducing heterogeneity among followers is that
in addition to tracking the number of followers that each leader needs to win, the state
space must now also keep track of the number of agents of each type that remain uncom-
mitted, say n(θ). Thus, with k types, this requires k+ 2 dimensions. This is problematic
because the value that agents obtain in general depends on combinations of these k + 2
dimensions, and thus on the history of transactions in a complicated way. This makes the
idea of working with a large number of fully heterogeneous followers a daunting task.
Allowing heterogeneity can be very interesting in many of the applications we considered.
Agents could differ in the value they give to each alternative, in their discount factors,
or in the probability of meeting each principal. However, to the best of our knowledge
there is nothing to suggest that introducing heterogeneity would change our results. To
illustrate this, we consider a simple example with three agents, in which we allow the
probability of each agent meeting each leader be heterogeneous (see Remark 7.5 in the
online Appendix). We show that if the winning prize for the principals is sufficiently large
there is a fully competitive equilibrium in the competitive game, and a unique equilibrium
in the monopolistic game, such that monopoly is preferred to competition. This is of
course just one example of the multiple sources of heterogeneity that are possible here.
While we were able to explore other sources of heterogeneity (e.g., in agents’ willingness
to pay) a general analysis is left for future research.
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader
meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The
follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting
the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m − 1) + p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with
probability one if this inequality holds strictly. Note that since i accepts offers p(m) >
−δ[wout(m − 1) − w(m)] with probability one, then any such proposal cannot be offered
in equilibrium, for L could make a lower offer and still get accepted. Thus, whenever L
meets a follower i in state m, she offers
(15) p(m) =
{ −δ[wout(m− 1)− w(m)] if (16) holds
−∞ otherwise.
L is willing to make the offer is state m if
αm[δv(m− 1)− p(m)] + (1− αm)δv(m) ≥ δv(m),
which boils down to
p(m) ≤ δ[v(m− 1)− V (m)],
as before. Thus the leader obtains a non-negative payoff from making an offer if and only
if
(16) s(m) ≡ [v(m− 1)− v(m)] + [wout(m− 1)− w(m)] ≥ 0
Now suppose that in equilibrium (16) holds strictly in state m. Then the follower meeting
the leader in state m must accept all such offers; i.e., αm = 1. This is because since the
follower accepts any offer higher than −δ[wout(m−1)−w(m)], if αm < 1 the leader would
increase the offer slightly, getting a discrete gain in payoffs. Thus, if in equilibrium the
follower rejects the leader’s offer with positive probability in state m, (16) must hold with
equality in state m; i.e., if αm < 1, then
s(m) = [v(m− 1)− v(m)] + [wout(m− 1)− w(m)] = 0
The value of an uncommitted follower in state m is
w(m) =
(
2
n+ 2m− 1
)
δw(m) +
(
n+ 2m− 3
n+ 2m− 1
)
δ[γmαmw (m− 1) + (1− γmαm)w (m)],
or equivalently,
w(m) = Hmδw (m− 1) ,
where
Hm ≡
(
(n+ 2m− 3)γmαm
n+ 2m− 1− 2δ − (n+ 2m− 3)δ(1− γmαm)
)
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Thus
(17) w(m) =
[
m∏
k=1
Hm
]
δmw
The value of a committed follower in state m is
wout (m) = γmαmδwout (m− 1) + (1− γmαm)δwout (m)
or
wout (m) =
(
γmαmδ
1− δ(1− γmαm)
)
wout (m− 1)
so that
(18) wout (m) =
[
m∏
k=1
(
γkαk
1− δ(1− γkαk)
)]
δmw.
The value for the leader in state m is
v(m) = γmαm(δv(m− 1)− p(m)) + (1− γmαm)δv(m)
or
(19) v(m) =
(
γmαmδ
1− δ(1− γmαm)
)
(v(m− 1) + wout(m− 1)− w(m)),
Now suppose that in equilibrium L makes a relevant offer in every m > 1. We will solve
for the equilibrium values and then come back and verify that (16) holds for all m to
check that this is an equilibrium. First, note that since L makes a relevant offer in every
meeting, (17) boils down to
(20) w(m) =
[
m∏
k=1
(
n+ 2k − 3
n+ 2k − 1− 2δ
)]
δmw =
[
m∏
k=1
r(k)
]
δmw
and (18) boils down to
(21) wout (m) = δ
mw.
Substituting (20) and (21) in (19), we have
v (m) = δv (m− 1) +
(
1− δ
m∏
k=1
r(k)
)
δmw
Recursively we have that
(22) v (m) = δmv +
[
m∑
l=1
(
1− δ
l∏
k=1
r(k)
)]
δmw
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Then note that
v(m−1)−v(m) = δm−1(1−δ)v+δm−1w
{
(1− δ)
m−1∑
l=1
(
1− δ
l∏
k=1
r(k)
)
− δ
(
1− δ
m∏
k=1
r(k)
)}
and
w(m)− wout(m− 1) = −
[
1− δ
m∏
k=1
r(k)
]
δm−1w
so substituting, (16) is
s∗(m) = (1− δ)δm−1
[
v + w
m∑
l=1
(
1− δ
l∏
k=1
r(k)
)]
≥ 0
which is satisfied if and only if
v + w
m∑
l=1
(
1− δ
l∏
k=1
r(k)
)
≥ 0
Because this always holds for v > 0 and w > 0, it follows that this is an equilibrium.
Next we show that this is the unique equilibrium with an induction argument. First note
from (17) and (19) that for all m ≥ 1, v(m) and w(m) are maximized when γm = αm = 1.
Then s∗(1) ≥ 0 implies s(1) = [v − v(1)] + [w − w(1)] > 0 whenever γ1α1 < 1. It follows
that in state m = 1 the leader makes a proposal with probability one; i.e., γ1 = 1. But
then α1 = 1 as well. For suppose α1 ∈ (0, 1). Then s(1) > 0 and the leader would gain by
increasing the offer slightly, getting it accepted with probability one. Now suppose that in
equilibrium γt = αt = 1 for all t < m. Consider the surplus in state m. Note that v(m−1)
and wout(m − 1) are exactly as in the equilibrium characterized above. Since v(m) and
w(m) are maximized when γm = αm = 1, then s
∗(m) ≥ 0 implies s(m) > 0 whenever
γmαm < 1. Thus γm = 1. As before, then also α1 = 1, for otherwise s(m) > 0 and the
leader would gain by increasing the offer slightly, getting it accepted with probability one.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Note that the total surplus in the game cannot be higher than
vA + vB + n (wA + wB) = S and any player can guarantee a payoff of zero by declining
all offers or not making any offers. Therefore, any value function, given the state, is
contained in the compact set
[
0, S
]
. We are going to prove existence by combining a fixed
point argument and a construction of equilibrium node by node.
The proof of existence follows a series of steps. We start first be defining an equilibrium
in a suitable way to apply regular fixed point arguments. We then proceed by focusing
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on a state ~m ≥ (2, 2), and we assume that there is an equilibrium in the continuation of
~m. Equivalently, we assume
(23)
{
W
(
~mj
)
,W out
(
~mj
)}
j=A,B
∈ [0, S]4 and {VA (~mj) , VB (~mj)}j=A,B ∈ [0, S]4
are well defined values. This assumption allows us to determine the value in states ~mA and
~mB for committed and uncommitted followers, as well as for the leaders. Using Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem we can show that there is an equilibrium in that particular state ~m,
conditional on the continuation values in states ~mA and ~mB. The third step is to deal
with all end nodes of the form (1,mB) and (mA, 1) for mA,mB ≥ 2 and show that a slight
modification of the same arguments give existence in all those states. This modification
is needed because the continuation values when the leaders win is fixed, but the other
continuation value is given by the state in which the losing side actually obtains the
support of an extra follower. This methodology leaves us with the final step which is
dealing with the nodes (1, 1), (1, 2) and (2, 1). Example 4.3 in the text has in fact already
constructed an equilibrium that emerges in these nodes so the existence of equilibrium
follows.
Step 1: Definition of equilibrium
First let’s define an equilibrium of the game node by node. An equilibrium of node ~m is (i)
a set of value functions {W (~m) ,W out (~m)} ∈ [0, S]2, {VA (~m) , VB (~m)}j=A,B ∈ [0, S]2,
(ii) transfers {pj (~m)}j=A,B ∈
[−S, S]2, and (iii) proposal probabilities
{γj (~m) , αj (~m)}j=A,B ∈ [0, 1]4 such that the following conditions hold:
(1) Leader j = A,B sets transfers to maximize her utility:
pj (~m) + δW
out
(
~mj
)
= δW (~m)
(2) Leaders and followers make and accept proposals optimally. Leader j makes a
proposal to the follower in state ~m with probability
γj (~m) =
 1 if Sj (~m) > 0[0, 1] if Sj (~m) = 00 if Sj (~m) < 0

where as before Sj (~m) is the surplus Sj (~m) = (W
out (~mj) + Vj (~m
j))−(W (~m) + Vj (~m)),
and the follower accepts the leader’s offer with probability
αj (~m) =
 1 if pj (~m) > δW (~m)− δW
out (~mj)
[0, 1] if pj (~m) = δW (~m)− δW out (~mj)
0 if pj (~m) < δW (~m)− δW out (~mj)

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(3) The value of a committed follower verifies
Wout (~m) = δ ×
∑
j=A,B pij × (γj (~m)αj (~m))×W out (~mj)
1− δ∑j=A,B pij × (1− γj (~m)αj (~m)) ,
the value of an uncommitted follower verifies
W (~m) =
∑
j=A,B pij × (γj (~m)αj (~m))× δW (~mj)
mA+mB−1−δ
mA+mB−2 − δ ×
∑
j=A,B pij × (1− γj (~m)αj (~m))
,
and leader j’s value verifies
V j (~m) =
∑
j=A,B pij × (γj (~m)αj (~m))× (δV j (~mj)− pj (~m))
1− δ∑j=A,B pij × (1− γj (~m)αj (~m))
Step 2: Interior Nodes: ~m ≥ (2, 2)
Let
[
0, S
]4∪[−S, S]2∪[0, 1]4 = Υ ⊂ R10 and let (Ŵ , Ŵ out, V̂ A, V̂ B) ∈ [0, S]4, (p̂A, p̂B) ∈[−S, S]2 and {γ̂A, α̂A, γ̂B, α̂B} ∈ [0, 1]4 be arbitrary. We now define the correspondences
to show existence of equilibrium at ~m whenever (23) holds.
(1) We define leader j’s best response fγj : Υ→ [0, 1] for j = A,B as
fγj
(
Ŵ , V̂ j
)
=

1 if W out (~mj) + Vj (~m
j) > Ŵ + V̂ j
[0, 1] if W out (~mj) + Vj (~m
j) = Ŵ + V̂ j
0 if W out (~mj) + Vj (~m
j) < Ŵ + V̂ j

and the follower’s best response when facing leader j, fαj : Υ→ [0, 1] for j = A,B
as
fαj
(
Ŵ , p̂j
)
=

1 if p̂j > δŴ − δW out (~mj)
[0, 1] if p̂j = δŴ − δW out (~mj)
0 if p̂j < δŴ − δW out (~mj)

Note that both fγj and fαj for j = A,B are upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dences with nonempty images. To show that the image is convex take (x1, x2) ∈
fγj
(
Ŵ , V̂ j
)
which implies that W out (~mj) + Vj (~m
j) = Ŵ + V̂ j and since in that
case fγj
(
Ŵ , V̂ j
)
= [0, 1], we have that the convex combination of (x1, x2) is also
in [0, 1]. The same applies to fαj .
(2) We define the leader’s optimal transfer correspondence fpj : Υ →
[−S, S] for
j = A,B as
fpj
(
Ŵ
)
= δ
(
Ŵ −W out (~mj))
Note these are continuous functions which are trivially non empty and convex
(they are single valued).
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(3) We define the committed followers’ value function fW out : Υ→
[
0, S
]
as
fW out (γ̂A, α̂A, γ̂B, α̂B) = δ ×
∑
j=A,B pij × (γ̂j × α̂j)×W out (~mj)
1− δ∑j=A,B pij × (1− γ̂j × α̂j) ,
the uncommitted followers’ value function fW : Υ→
[
0, S
]
as
fW (γ̂A, α̂A, γ̂B, α̂B) =
∑
j=A,B pij × (γ̂j × α̂j)× δW (~mj)
mA+mB−1−δ
mA+mB−2 − δ ×
∑
j=A,B pij × (1− γ̂j × α̂j)
,
and the leaders’ value functions fVj : Υ→
[
0, S
]
for j = A,B as
fV j (p̂j, γ̂A, α̂A, γ̂B, α̂B) =
∑
j=A,B pij × (γ̂j × α̂j)× (δV j (~mj)− p̂j)
1− δ∑j=A,B pij × (1− (γ̂j × α̂j))
Note that for any δ < 1 these are continuous functions which are trivially non
empty and convex (they are single valued).
Note that the transformation Γ : Υ→ Υ defined as
Γ =
({
fγj
}
j=A,B
,
{
fαj
}
j=A,B
,
{
fpj
}
j=A,B
, fW out , fW ,
{
fVj
}
j=A,B
)
is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence, defined on a non empty, compact convex
subset of R10 (i.e. Υ = [0, S]4 ∪ [−S, S]2 ∪ [0, 1]4) with images that are non-empty and
convex. Thus Kakutani’s fixed point Theorem applies and there is some
x∗ =
{
W ∗,W out∗, V A∗, V B∗, p∗A, p
∗
B, γ
∗
A, α
∗
A, γ
∗
B, α
∗
B
} ∈ Υ such that Γ (x∗) = x∗.
Step 3: Boundary Nodes excluding (1, 2), (2, 1) and (1, 1).
Let’s consider now ~m = (1,mB) with mB ≥ 2 and ~m = (mA, 1) with mA ≥ 2. Take an
arbitrary ~m = (1,mB) and note that W
(
~mA
)
= W out
(
~mA
)
= wA, VA
(
~mA
)
= vA and
VB
(
~mA
)
= vB, so (23) turns into
(24)
{
W
(
~mB
)
,W out
(
~mB
)} ∈ [0, S]2 and {VA (~mB) , VB (~mB)} ∈ [0, S]2
Therefore as long as the values are well defined for ~mB = (1,mB − 1) a similar argument
to that used in Step 2 leads to existence of equilibrium as long as mB > 2. This is because
at (1, 2), (24) is satisfied for a given set of values.
Step 4: Nodes (1, 2), (2, 1) and (1, 1).
Since in Example 4.3 we showed that there was an equilibrium with trade in all nodes,
this step is straightforward. The values for W (1, 1), W (1, 2), W (2, 1) and W (2, 2) were
presented in the example. Because the equilibrium involves trade in every node we must
have that {γj (~m) , αj (~m)}j=A,B = (1, 1) for any ~m ∈ {(1, 2) , (2, 1) , (1, 1)}. Note that
the explicit form of Wout (~m) in the case of trade after every meeting was given by (6) and
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the transfers are fully determined by pj (~m) = δ (W (~m)−Wout (~mj)). Finally, expression
(7) determines V j (~m) when considering the transfers and the fact that in the last node
we have V j (1, 1) = δpij (vj + wj) + δpi−jvj.
Wrap Up: Steps 4, 3 and 2 define a recursion that gives existence.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. We will show that for any j = A,B there is a v∗ ∈ R+ such that
if vj ≥ v∗, when all players play the proposed equilibrium strategies, Sj(~m) ≥ 0 for all ~m.
Consider the surplus expression (2). Note that (5) and (6) imply that Wout(~m
j)−W (~m)
does not depend on (vA, vA, vB, vB), and is therefore a constant. It follows that v−j and
v−j do not affect Sj(~m), and vj and vj enter Sj(~m) only through the term Vj(~m
j)−Vj(~m).
Now, note that having expressed pj(~m) in terms of the primitives of the model, we can
solve (7) as a stand alone partial difference equation, to obtain
Vj (~m) = (δpij)
mj
[
m−j−1∑
l=0
(
mj − 1 + l
l
)
(δpi−j)
l
]
vj
+ (δpi−j)
m−j
[
mj−1∑
l=0
(
m−j − 1 + l
l
)
(δpij)
l
]
vj −H(~m).
(25)
where H(~m) is a function of prices pj(r, s) for r ≤ mj, s ≤ m−j, which are constant in
(vj, vj, v−j, v−j) by (5) and (6). Thus Vj(~m
j)− Vj(~m) is given by
{
(δpij)
mj−1
[
m−j−1∑
l=0
(
mj − 2 + l
l
)
(δpi−j)
l
]
− (δpij)mj
[
m−j−1∑
l=0
(
mj − 1 + l
l
)
(δpi−j)
l
]}
vj
− (δpi−j)m−j
(
mA +mB − 2
mj − 1
)
(δpij)
mj−1 vj +H(~m)−H(~mj).
We will show that this expression can be made arbitrarily large by increasing vj or reducing
vj. The last line is a constant. From the second line it follows that all else equal, there is
a v∗ such that if vj < v
∗, then Sj(~m) > 0. Next, after some algebra, the bracket in the
first line can be written as
(δpij)
mj−1
[
(1− δ)
m−j−1∑
l=0
(
mj − 1 + l
l
)
(δpi−j)
l +
(
mA +mB − 2
mj − 1
)
(δpi−j)
m−j
]
> 0.
Thus, all else equal, there is a v∗ such that if vj > v∗, then Sj(~m) > 0.
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Proof of Theorem 4.5. The first statement follows as a corollary of Theorem 4.6. Now
consider the second part. From expression (5), we have
(26)
W (q, q) =
q−2∑
l=0
(
q−1+l∏
k=0
C(2q−k)
)
×
(
q− 1+l
l
)
× [(δpiA)q(δpiB)lwA + (δpiB)q(δpiA)lwB]
On the other hand, with a single alternative, w(q) = (
∏q
m=1 r(m)) δ
qw. Now, since
r(k) = n+2k−3
n+2k−(1+2δ) by definition and n = 2q − 1, we have r(k) = C(q + k). Thus
(27) w(q) =
(
q∏
k=1
C(q + k)
)
δqw =
(
q−1∏
k=0
C(2q − k)
)
δqw
Suppose without loss of generality that wA > wB. We want to show that for sufficiently
large q the equilibrium payoff of an uncommitted follower in the game with a single
alternative yielding value wB is larger than his (competitive) equilibrium payoff in the
game with two alternatives yielding value wA and wB. Suppose not. Then making w = wB
in (27), and dividing (26) by (27),
U(q) ≡
q−2∑
l=0
(
q−1+l∏
k=q
C(2q−k)
)
×
(
q− 1+l
l
)
×
[
(piA)
q(δpiB)
l + (piB)
q(δpiA)
l
(
wB
wA
)]
≥ wB
wA
Now, since δ ≤ 1, ∏q−1+lk=q C (2q − k) ≤ 1, and wB/wA < 1, for any integer q, we have
U(q) <
∑
j=A,B
(pij)
q
q−2∑
l=0
Γ (q + l)
Γ (q)
(δpij)
l
l!
≡ U(q)
where for any integer k, we define Γ (k) ≡ (k − 1)!. Now define the function
F (a, b, c, z) ≡
∞∑
l=0
(
a+l
l
)(
b+l
l
)(
c+l
l
) zl,
and note that we can write
U(q) =
∑
j=A,B
(pij)
q
(
F (q, 1, 1, δpi−j)−
∞∑
l=q−1
Γ (q + l)
Γ (q)
(δpi−j)
l
l!
)
=
∑
j=A,B
{(
pij
1− δpi−j
)q
− (pij)q
∞∑
l=q−1
Γ (q + l)
Γ (q)
(δpi−j)
l
l!
}
.
(28)
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where the equality follows from the fact that F (a, b, b, z) = (1− z)−a (see Property 15.1.8
for hypergeometric functions in Abramowitz and Stegun (2012); p.556). Noting that(
pij
1− δpi−j
)
=
(
1− pi−j
1− δpi−j
)
< 1
as long as δ < 1, it follows that for any ε > 0 there is a Q such that if q > Q, then
U(q) < ε. Thus, for any piB/piA, there is a Q such that U(q) < piB/piA whenever q > Q.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let γj (~m) be the probability that leader j = A,B makes an offer
in state ~m, αj (~m) be the probability that an uncommitted follower accepts an offer from
leader j = A,B in state ~m, and µj (~m) ≡ γj (~m)αj (~m). Then
W (~m) =
(
1
mA +mB − 1
)
δW (~m)
+
(
mA +mB − 2
mA +mB − 1
) ∑
j=A,B
pij
(
µj (~m) δW (~m
j)
+ (1− µj) δW (~m)
)
.
(29)
For j = A,B, define
ξj (~m) ≡ δpijµj (~m)(
mA+mB−1
mA+mB−2
)
(1− δ) + δ∑j=A,B pijµj (~m)
whenever ~m 6= (1, 1), and ξj (1, 1) ≡ 0. Then we can write (29) as
(30) W (~m) =
∑
j=A,B
ξj (~m)W
(
~mj
)
for all ~m and j = A,B. Note in particular that the recursion (30) implies that if wA, wB >
0 (as we are assuming here), then W (~m) ≥ 0 for all ~m.
We need to show that W (q, q) < max {wA (q) , wB (q)}. The proof follows from three
lemmas. Lemma 7.2 establishes the result for q = 1 and shows an additional result
for all boundary states which is used in Lemma 7.3. The proof for interior states is
by induction. Lemma 7.3 establishes the base case, and Lemma 7.4 the induction step.
Iterative application of the induction step covers the entire state space and establishes
the result. We begin with Lemma 7.1, which establishes an intermediate result that is
used in the proof of Lemmas 7.2 and 7.4.
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Lemma 7.1 (Bound). In any MPE of the game Γ(~m),
W (~m) ≤ max
j∈{A,B}
{
δr (mj)W
(
~mj
)}
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Note that for all mA ≥ 2,mB ≥ 2 we have
W (~m) = ξA (~m)W
(
~mA
)
+ ξB (~m)W
(
~mB
)
Thus we need to show that
∑
j=A,B
ξj (~m)W
(
~mj
) ≤ δmax{r (mA)W (~mA) , r (mB)W (~mB)}
(a) Assume first that W
(
~mA
) ≥ W (~mB) so it is sufficient if[ ∑
j=A,B
ξj (~m)
]
W
(
~mA
) ≤ δmax{r (mA)W (~mA) , r (mB)W (~mB)}
Note that since r (m) = n+2m−3
n+2m−(1+2δ) , then[ ∑
j=A,B
ξj (~m)
]
=
δ [piAµA (~m) + piBµB (~m)]
mA+mB−1
mA+mB−2 (1− δ) + δ [piAµA (~m) + piBµB (~m)]
≤ δmin {r (mA) , r (mB)} .
(31)
Then it is sufficient if
min {r (mA) , r (mB)}W
(
~mA
) ≤ max{r (mA)W (~mA) , r (mB)W (~mB)}
which is true when either r (mA)W
(
~mA
) ≥ r (mB)W (~mB) or the opposite holds.
(b) Suppose instead that W
(
~mA
) ≤ W (~mB). Then it is sufficient if
[ ∑
j=A,B
ξj (~m)
]
W
(
~mB
) ≤ δmax
 r (mA)W
(
~mA
)
,
r (mB)W
(
~mB
)

and again using (31) it is sufficient if
min {r (mA) , r (mB)}W
(
~mB
) ≤ max{r (mA)W (~mA) , r (mB)W (~mB)}
which is true. This completes the proof.
Lemma 7.2 (Boundaries).
W (mA, 1) < wB (1) for all mA ≥ 1 and W (1,mB) < wA (1) for all mB ≥ 1
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Proof of Lemma 7.2. The result for state ~m = (1, 1) follows immediately from the fact
that W (1, 1) = 0. Now consider the remaining boundary states (states adjacent to termi-
nal states). Solving the recursion (30) for the boundaries, we obtain
W (mA, 1) =
(
mA−1∑
l=1
ξB (mA − l, 1)
l−1∏
k=0
ξA (mA − k, 1) + ξB (mA, 1)
)
wB(32)
W (1,mB) =
(
mB−2∑
l=1
ξA (1,mB − l)
l−1∏
k=0
ξB (1,mB − k) + ξA (1,mB)
)
wA(33)
for all mA,mB ≥ 1.
Consider ~m = (2, 1). Note that since
W (2, 1) =
δpiBµB (2, 1)
2 (1− δ) + δ (piAµA (2, 1) + piBµB (2, 1))wB
for n ≥ 3,
W (2, 1) <
δ
2− δwB <
(n− 1)δ
n+ 1− 2δwB = r(1)δwB = wB(1)
By the same argument, W (1, 2) < wA (1). Next, consider W (mA, 1) for mA ≥ 3. We
have
W (mA, 1) =
(
mA−3∑
l=0
ξB (mA − (1 + l) , 1)
l∏
k=0
ξA (mA − k, 1) + ξB (mA, 1)
)
wB
=
( ∑mA−3
l=0 [ξB (mA − (1 + l) , 1) + ξA (mA − (1 + l) , 1)− 1]
∏l
k=0 ξA (mA − k, 1)
−∏mA−2k=0 ξA (mA − k, 1) + (ξB (mA, 1) + ξA (mA, 1))
)
wB ,
and since (ξB (mA − (1 + l) , 1) + ξA (mA − (1 + l) , 1)) ≤ 1, it follows that
W (mA, 1) ≤ (ξB (mA, 1) + ξA (mA, 1))wB < δr (1)wB = wB (1)
Analogously, we have that W (1,mB) < wA (1).
Lemma 7.3 (Base Case).
W (mA, 2) < max {wA (mA) , wB (2)} for all mA ≥ 2
and
W (2,mB) < max {wA (2) , wB (mB)} for all mB ≥ 2
Proof of Lemma 7.3. First, note that
W (2, 2) ≤ ξ (4) max {wB (1) , wA (1)}
< δ
(
2
3− δ
)
max {wB (1) , wA (1)}
< δr(2) max {wB (1) , wA (1)} = max {wB (2) , wA (2)}
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Next consider W (mA, 2). By successive application of Lemma 7.1
W (mA, 2) ≤ max {δr (mA)W (mA − 1, 2) , δW (mA, 1) r (2)}
≤ max
{
δ2
1∏
j=0
r (mA − j)W (mA − 2, 2) , δ2
0∏
j=0
r (mA − j)W (mA − 1, 1) r (2) , δW (mA, 1) r (2)
}
....
≤ max
{
δmA
mA−2∏
j=0
r (mA − j)W (1, 2) , max
k≤mA−2
{
δk+1
k−1∏
j=0
r (mA − j)W (mA − k, 1) r (2)
}
, δW (mA, 1) r (2)
}
Now, we have shown in Lemma 7.2 that W (mA, 1) < wB (1) for all mA ≥ 1, and
W (1,mB) < wA (1) for all mB ≥ 1. Using these results in the RHS of the expression
above, we get
W (mA, 2) < max
δmA
mA−2∏
j=0
r (mA − j)wA(1), maxk≤mA−2
{
δk+1
∏k−1
j=0 r (mA − j)wB(1)
}
r (2) , δr (2)wB(1)

Using (20) we get that
max
k≤mA−2
{
δk+1
k−1∏
j=0
r (mA − j)wB(1)
}
= δ2r (mA)wB(1),
so
W (mA, 2) < max
{
δmA
mA−2∏
j=0
r (mA − j)wA(1), δr (2)wB(1)
}
.
Therefore, using equation (20) and Lemma 7.2 one more time, we have
W (mA, 2) < max {wA(mA), wB(2)} .
By the same logic, W (2,mB) < max {wB(mB), wA(2)}.
Lemma 7.4 (Induction Step). Consider any state ~m ≥ (3, 3). If
(34) W
(
~mB
) ≤ max {wA (mA) , wB (mB − 1)}
and
(35) W
(
~mA
) ≤ max {wA (mA − 1) , wB (mB)}
then
(36) W (~m) ≤ max {wA (mA) , wB (mB)}
Proof of Lemma 7.4. By Lemma 7.1,
(37) W (~m) ≤ max{δr (mA)W (~mA) , δr (mB)W (~mB)}
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Using (34) and (35), and then noting that wj(mj) = δr (mj)wj (mj − 1) for j = A,B,
and substituting, (37) becomes
W (~m) ≤ max
 max {wA (mA) , δr (mA)wB (mB)} ,max {δr (mB)wA (mA) , wB (mB)}
 ≤ max {wA (mA) , wB (mB)}
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The proof of Proposition 4.1 implies that the equilibrium char-
acterized in Proposition 4.1 is still the unique MPE if and only if
v ≥ −w
m∑
l=1
(
1− δ
l∏
k=1
r(k)
)
Thus, for any given w < 0, there is a v(w) such that this condition is satisfied if v > v(w).
Similarly, for any given w < 0 there is a δ(w) ∈ (0, 1) such that this condition is satisfied
if δ > δ(w).
Remark 7.5. In the benchmark model we assumed that he matching probabilities are uni-
form among followers. Here we show with an example that allowing matching probabilities
to be heterogeneous across followers does not invalidate our results. For simplicity, we
focus on a fully competitive equilibrium of the competitive game.
Example. When followers differ on a dimension that is payoff relevant the state space must
be modified accordingly. This is because the identities of the remaining uncommitted
followers may matter. The reason is quite intuitive: a follower needs to know what is the
probability of being selected again in the future to calculate the value of waiting (rejecting
the offer) and this probability depends crucially on the pool of uncommitted followers.
Here we define the state space Ω in terms of the identities of committed followers for each
leader. Let N be the set of agents, and N = 2|N |. Then
Ω =
{
(Q,R) ∈ N 2 : Q ∩R = ∅}
The pair (CA, CB) ∈ Ω describes the set of followers committed to A (CA) and to
B (CB). Because followers are heterogenous we have now a set of value functions:
W (CA, CB) = {Wk (CA, CB) for k ∈ N}. In the single leader case we let wk (C) be the
value of uncommitted follower k when the leader j traded with followers in C.
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For simplicity, we assume homogeneous payoffs; i.e., vj = v and vj = v and wj = w for
j = A,B. With heterogenous matching probabilities we need to make assumptions about
how this matching process changes after trading. We assume that
(38) piij (CA, CB) =
piij∑
j′∈{A,B}
∑
i′ /∈{CA∪CB} pii′j′
if i /∈ {CA ∪ CB}
and 0 if i ∈ {CA ∪ CB}.
Assume that there are three followers, N = {1, 2, 3}, and the matching probabilities are
arbitrary and are updated according to (38). We can show that for sufficiently large v the
competitive game has a fully competitive equilibrium and the monopolistic game has a
unique MPE with trade in every state. In this case payoffs at the beginning of each game
for follower 1 are given by
W1 (0, 0) =
(
1
1− pi1A − pi1B
)(
pi2Api3A + pi3Bpi2B
pi1B + pi1A
)
w and
w1 (0) = 2
(
pi3
1− pi1
)(
pi2
pi1
)
w
Thus a follower prefers monopoly over competition as long as(
pi2
1− pi1
)(
pi3
pi1
)
>
(
1
1− pi1A − pi1B
)(
pi2Api3A + pi2Bpi3B
pi1B + pi1A
)
Assume that pi1 = pi1A +pi1B so the total probability that 1 meets a leader in the compet-
itive game is equal to the probability that he meets the leader in the monopolistic game.
Now we have that W1 (0, 0) < ω1 (0) as long as
(pi3A + pi3B) (pi2B + pi2A) > pi2Api3A + pi3Bpi2B
which is true as long as pi3Api2B + pi3Bpi2A > 0. Thus, if every follower has a chance of
meeting both leaders, followers are better off under monopoly.
